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Abstract
Free will is an old philosophical enigma that has been recently revived by
neuropsychology. We restrict ourselves to the problem that determinism seems
to allow only an illusion of freedom but random decissions do not contain
any freedom either. We show that this is a problem of natural sciences, not
philosophy. Physics motivates replacing determinism by the principle of weak
causality and introducing the concept of liberty. Its empirical basis remains
untouched, but the theoretical interpretations of the state space in Newton
theory and of the space-time in general relativity are changed. The emerging
understanding of time agrees with the idea suggested once by Popper. In
biology, the most important liberties are those of mutation, of motion and of
the portable neural representation. We distinguish freedom and liberty. Each
freedom is associated with some liberty and is defined as the ability to perform
three processes called realization, selection and use of memory. This makes
freedom accessible to experimental study. The freedom of will is explained
by giving account of the underlying specific liberty and processes. While the
realization has an ample space for randomness, the selection is mostly causal.
Thus, determinism can be rejected without forcing decissions to be random.
The experiments of Libet and the role of consciousness are discussed.
1 Introduction
The interest in the free will has been enhanced today by the progress in neuropsychol-
ogy. [1]. The old philosophical enigma is concisely described in [2]. One particular
problem seems to be the following. If determinism is assumed, then the free will
appears to be an illusion: everything is fixed and there seems to be no freedom.1 On
the other hand, if determinism is rejected, then it seems that decissions of the will
must be random. Thus, there is no control and this does not look very free either.
There are other problems associated with the free will, such as morality etc. We
shall ignore these here.
In the present paper, we are going to explain how a solution of the above problem
emerges from natural sciences. Physics teaches us how determinism can be abolished
and biology shows the way of how decissions of the will then still need not become
random. The paper is necessarily a sketch of a research project rather than a
complete scientific analysis considering all details and aspects. But we shall try
hard to formulate the main ideas as clearly and distinctly as possible and to make
them accessible to readers with various backgrounds.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Sec. 2 is dedicated to physics and asks
the question which physical phenomena are strictly tied by unique rules and which
liberty remains after the physical laws are accepted. We find that the liberty is
large even in Newton mechanics: the choice of system and the choice of its initial
data are free. We give this liberty a slightly different interpretation than is usually
adopted. Then, a short account of quantum mechanics will show that it allows
even more liberty and that the additional liberty does not concern exclusively the
micro-world. This motivates the formulation of the weak causality principle and the
corresponding notion of time on which the conceptual framework of this paper is
based (c.f. [4]). This notion of time is not compatible with the usual understanding
of general relativity, but a subtle change in the interpretation of spacetime can
make the framework logically coherent. This reinterpretation does not influence any
observable property.
The examples met in physics motivate the introduction of the central notion of
the paper, the liberty, in Sec. 3. A liberty is constituted by alternative possibilities
under certain conditions and is experimentally testable.
The final section lists the most important liberties that concern living organisms.
It is the liberty of mutation, of motion and of portable neural representative. While
the first two are simple and well defined, the last one remains a little obscure as to
its actual structure within nervous system. We analyze some experiments by Jim
1There is a philosophical school called compatibilism trying to define freedom in a way com-
patible with determinism [3]. It is not satisfactory because the assumption of determinism is not
plausible.
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Gould to show that what is represented as well as the existence of such representation
by neural structures are clearer. We distinguish liberty and freedom. Liberties can
be found even in physics but freedom concerns only the living organisms—even
bacteria—, so our language is a little different from the common use. The concept
of freedom includes structures and processes in living organisms by means of which
they take advantage of liberties. Several freedoms are described and the respective
structures are studied. We finish with the freedom of will, which turns out to have
the same general structure as all other freedoms. It is understood as a natural
phenomenon and given a position in the class of similar phenomena. We specify the
role of consciousness in this particular case and use it to give the experiments by
Libet a new interpretation.
Two processes underlying any freedom are the realization of the alternatives con-
tained in a liberty and the selection of one from the list of the alternatives. Some
kind of memory is always necessary to carry out the two processes; hence use of
memory is the third basic process. As a rule, the realization contains a lot of ran-
domness while the selection is mostly causal. This is possible because the weak
causality principle does not abolish the causality wholesale.
To prove that the determinismus is wrong does not belong to the aims of the
present paper. We just accept that it has become very unplausible after eighty years
of quantum mechanics. Everything we do is to assume that the determinismus is
false and that the weak causality principle is true. Then, we shall check the self-
consistence of the new framework, see if the validity of the principle and the existence
of specific liberies are compatible with the contemporary empirical knowledge as well
as find the new theoretical ordering and understanding of this knowledge provided
by the new language.
2 What the laws of physics do not bind
We start with physics not just because the author is a theoretical physicist and has
thus some advantage here but mainly to show that physics cannot be blamed for
forcing determinism on us. Moreover, we shall observe that there is a lot of liberty
in physics and shall be able to study the nature of the liberty in a rigorous way.
In the present section is also an attempt to explain the relevant physics in a way
that can also be followed by non physicists. It will therefore be necessarily simplified
and many details that are dear to the heart of a physicist will have to be skipped.
We will also avoid all technicalities.
2
2.1 Old but nor dead: Newton mechanics
What is generally known as mechanics is called Newton mechanics here in order to
distinguish it from quantum mechanics. The main question of this section is: how
much is controlled and ruled by the laws of physics? If we are to understand this
more or less clearly, we need to understand the basic common structure of the laws of
the theories such as Newton mechanics, quantum mechanics and general relativity.
A few abstract and general notions are needed for that: system, dynamical equation,
state and space of states.
The system in Newton mechanics consists of particles with given masses. Only
after the system is chosen (the number of particles, their masses and interaction
with each other and with the outside), the theory give us its dynamical equation,
i.e, the law that every motion of the system must fulfil. The law alone however does
not determine the motion. To obtain a unique motion, a state of the system must
be chosen at a given instant of time, mostly at the beginning of the motion and then
evolved by the dynamical equation. The state in Newton theory is constituted by
the position, direction of motion and velocity of each particle. All possible states
form the so-called space of states.
Let us consider an example. The trajectory of a bullet depends on the position
from which it is shot, on the direction of the gun and on the amount of powder
loaded. The position can be described by three coordinates (three numbers), the
direction by two angles (two numbers) and the amount of powder is tantamount to
the velocity of the bullet, which is one number. In this way, six numbers are sufficient
to describe the initial state of the bullet. The resulting ballistic curve of the shot
is unique in principle. It can be also calculated from the dynamical equation. The
bullet is then at some position, it has one direction of motion and some velocity at
every time instant after the shot, that is exactly one state. As every state is given
by six numbers, the state space can be viewed as the set of all number six-tuples.
This is the general logical structure of the laws. What remains undetermined by
the theory? First, the choice of the system does. The choice determines what is
the dynamical equation and what is the state space. Then, any state from the state
space is freely eligible and the choice makes the motion unique. Isaac Newton was
aware of this feature. For instance, the fact that all planets known to his time moved
in the same plane around the Sun could not be derived from his equations and he
wrote [6]: ”Deus corpora singula ita locavit.” In our language, God has chosen the
initial state.
The freedom in the choice of state is usually understood in a passive sense as
the generality of the dynamical equation, that is, its applicability to many different
situations that may occur spontaneously in Nature. It seems, however, that one can
go a step further and interpret the freedom as an active freedom of physicists. The
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assumption can be formulated as follows.
Physicists are free to choose a system from a broad system class and a
state of the system from a large pert of the corresponding state space.
Then, they can set out this system in this state in a laboratory (or
elsewhere) at an arbitrary time.
We can call this hypothesis Realizability of Physical States. The liberty that
Newton attributed to God in the large is so attributed to physicists in the small.
There is a saying that everything not explicitly allowed is forbidden in German-
speaking countries while everything not explicitly forbidden is allowed in English-
speaking ones. Accordingly, we adopt the Anglo-Saxon standpoint here.
I could not find a direct formulation of the realizability of physical states in the
literature. It seems that it is always tacitly assumed in the work of experimental
physicists. In any case it is completely compatible with empirical praxis as well as
with everyday laboratory work. Generally, this kind of experimental freedom seems
even to be one of the basic assumptions of science. As concerns the trajectories of the
bullets, the hunters have the experience that they can carry their guns everywhere
in order to shoot from there in any direction they like. The hunt would not be much
fun else.
One of the basic principles of statistical mechanics can be viewed as a statement
about a different kind of liberty. To explain this principle, let us limit ourselves to
thin gas in equilibrium. Such a system contains an enormous number of particles.
It is practically impossible to determine the state of such a system by some mea-
surements, or to realize a chosen state of it in the lab. The available information
about the system includes only values of some overall quantities such as total en-
ergy, particle number and volume. There are many states that are compatible with
such description. Now, the principle that we are explaining says that all states that
are compatible with fixed energy, particle number and volume are equally proba-
ble. (The name of this principle is Micro-Canonical Distribution). More precisely,
if we set up very many vessels that have the same volume and that contain the
same number of gas particles with the same total energy in each vessel, then every
allowed state appears with the same frequency. Independently of how the vessels
with the gas are manufactured, all of the allowed states are present with the same
probability. Thus, we can realize any of them although we do not know and, in fact,
cannot find, which. Still, the principle has many interesting consequences and is
very useful.
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2.2 Rise and fall of determinism
An important feature of Newton mechanics is that the values of all observable me-
chanical properties of a system are uniquely determined by the state. In our example,
the energy, momentum, angular momentum etc. of the bullet to a given time can be
calculated from its position, motion direction and velocity at the same time. Assume
that the entire world is mechanical, that is, it can be reduced in its entirety to a sys-
tem of massive particles and forces between them so that all properties of all objects
could be calculated from their mechanical properties, then a surprising consequence
follows. If the state of the world were known at some time, then everything what
can be known about the world at any other time could be calculated in terms of the
world dynamical equation. Even if no such complete knowledge or calculation were
possible, be it for practical or principal reasons, but if the world were a mechanical
system, then it would still follow that everything what ever happens including every
detail is predetermined (or post-determined). The only liberty that remained would
be the freedom in the choice of an initial state from the (huge) state space of the
world. This view of the world is called determinism.
Determinism was popular in the nineteen century because of the great progress
then in the project of reducing all physical properties to the purely mechanical
ones. For example, temperature can be so explained and calculated, if one assumes
that macroscopic bodies consist of invisibly small particles—atoms or molecules—
and that these particles move according to mechanical laws. It turns out that
the temperature of a body is proportional to the average one-particle energy of its
constituent particles. However, in the first quarter of the next century, the more
basic quantum theory emerged, and this theory does not support the deterministic
view (we shall study quantum theory in the next subsection).
Newton mechanics, if cut down to size, remains valid. If we restrict ourself to
systems of macroscopic bodies that are not sensitive to the influence of the quantum
micro-world, that move with velocities that are much smaller than the velocity of
light, and if the gravitational field is weak then the bodies would move with high
precision according to Newton mechanics.
Now, an important aspects of the principle of realizability of physical states from
the previous subsection can be explained. There, a real freedom rather than an
apparent one has beed postulated. This would contradict the validity of Newton
mechanics if the principle would concern only mechanical systems. The inclusion
of physicists into the formulation of the principle allows us to avoid the paradox,
because Newton mechanics cannot be considered as valid for the whole extended
system consisting of the original one plus the physicist.
Although the freedom of physicics thus concerns the interpretation of some aspect
of Newton mechanics, it is primarily a property of living organisms. This, it turn,
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cannot be studied by Newton mechanics and we don’t understand it yet. It will be
studied systematically in Sec. 4.
2.3 What we learn from quantum mechanics
Quantum mechanics has the same basic logical structure as Newton mechanics.
Again, there is an affluence of various quantum systems. With each system a dy-
namical equation and a space of states is associated. Given a state at a time instant,
then the state at any other time can be calculated from the dynamical equation and
is unique.
And again, the choice of system and state is not restricted by any rule in quantum
mechanics, only by practical feasibility. The only difference is that the realizability
of physical states is explicitly formulated in some textbooks of quantum mechanics.
For example [7], P. 48, contains the realizability as a part of the so-called super-
position principle. This may be partially stimulated by the fact that a formulation
of quantum mechanics without observers is difficult. Still, the original reason for
including physicists into the realizability principle of Newton mechanics need not
hold here. If quantum mechanics is applicable to the extended system containing
physicists no contradiction has to result.
There are however other important features that make quantum mechanics very
different from Newton mechanics. We cannot explain all, but two of them will
play an important role later. These are the indistinguishability of quantum systems
and the statistical character of quantum mechanics. The first means that quantum
systems of the same kind such as all photons, all hydrogen atoms or all molecules
with the same compositions are utterly and absolutely equal. Two products of some
mass production factory may look equal, but they can be recognized from each
other, we can, e.g., make a mark on one, there is no question which of them is here
and which is there, etc. This is impossible with quantum systems even to such an
extent that any physically sensible state of a system containing two particles of the
same kind must be invariant with respect to their exchange. Moreover, there is a
relatively small number of different kinds while systems of each kind occur in a huge
number. This reducibility of the micro-world to few absolutely equal building blocks
has no analogy in the classical world. It will turn out to be important to the biology
and to the freedom of living organisms.
The statistical character is not apparent at the level of dynamical equation, which
determines the states uniquely and is sometimes classified as deterministic, but is
rather associated with the state2. Given a state, then there are quantities the
2This is in fact analogous to the statistical mechanics, where states can be identified with dis-
tribution functions. The dynamical law is the so-called Liouville equation and it also determines
the distribution function at any instant of time uniquely if it is known at one. The values of mea-
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measurements of which always give the same value from some set that is called
spectrum of the quantities. One says that such a quantity have a sharp value in the
state. Most quantities however are said to have no values in the state in spite of their
measurability. That is to say, their measurements give different results even if the
state on which the measurements are done remains the same. Only the distribution
of these results can be calculated from the state, i.e., each value from the spectrum
has a fixed probability determined by the state. Let us show typical details by means
of an example.
As our system, we choose a single photon. Of course, we can never observe
a single photon in the everyday life. What we know as light is always a cloud
of a large number of photons. To create a single photon requires a sophisticated
technique (which need not be described now). The photon can moreover be created
in a state, say, in which its momentum has a sharp value. According to the well-
known Heisenberg uncertainty relation, the position of the photon is then totally
”unsharp”. What does this mean for the measurement of the position?
The spectrum of position is the whole space. We can measure the position from
a subset of the spectrum by a photographic plate. The basic property is that a
single photon can create only a single black point on the plate if it hits it. Hence,
”totally unsharp” cannot mean a large smeared smudge on the plate made by a single
photon. Instead, it means that repeated measurements will result in many black
points and that the distribution of the points, after very many measurements have
been done, is uniform. The following interpretation can, may be, help. The photon
in our state does not have any position at all before hitting the plate. The position is
”created” only by its interaction with the plate. The interaction cannot be controlled
and gives different results in each run. Of course, one cannot readily imagine some
object without a position; one of the main principles of some philosophical theories of
existence is that existing objects must have positions. However, there is no difficulty
for this philosophical principle: one can simply imagine that it is the state of the
photon that is smeared throughout the space. An ocean is an object, the position
of which is very extended indeed. Only, the physicists prefer to speak of the photon
as not having any position to saying that its position is the whole space because the
position is a specific well-defined quantity in quantum mechanics and the possible
values of this quantity are points (in our language, its spectrum is a set of points).
Generally, quantum experiments look as follows. First, the experiment itself
consists of a number of runs. In each run, we obtain a single quantum system
(here the photon) from a source, which is some macroscopic apparatus. The source
is constructed in such a way that the photon obtained from it in each run is in
surable quantities however are not determined uniquely, only their probabilities can be calculated
from the distribution function.
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the same quantum state. The (macroscopic) arrangement of the source and the
measuring apparatus (here the plate), which is again a macroscopic system, is the
same for each run. The runs are performed at different times and have therefore
some time order. They can be performed at different places. In each run, we obtain
a certain value from the spectrum which can be read off at the measuring apparatus
(here, the black points at the plate). If the experiment has sufficiently many runs
then the distribution of the values obtained is well approximated by the probabilities
that are calculated from the state according to rules of quantum mechanics.
In effect, everything done by an experimentalist is to manipulate and observe some
macroscopic devices. The account of the experiment can be completely reduced
to description of the behavior of macroscopic objects without omitting anything
indispensable for its understanding. It is the macroscopic structure of the source
that says the physicist whether it sends out photons or whether it will rather be
electrons, as well as what is the state of the particles. And it is a macroscopic change
of the measuring apparatus that disclose to him which value of the measured quantity
has been found. Hence, the unpredictability is not just hidden in the micro-world
without any relation to our macro-world. It is the macroscopic behavior that is
not always predictable. More precisely, in the photon experiment, the quantum
mechanics does identify a cause for the distribution of the macroscopic black points
at the plate. That is because all photons that has been sent have had the state of a
sharp momentum. But it does not specify any cause of a particular run giving this
particular black point and not another one.
The reader can be embarrassed at the strange dichotomy of micro- and macro-
scopic that we have assumed in this subsection. This is an old problem of quantum
mechanics that is not yet solved completely, but there are some promissing ideas [8].
2.4 Causality principle
Causality is an ancient assumption. For instance, Platon’s formulation in Timaeos
is:
Everything that happens must happen because of a cause; for it is im-
possible that anything comes into being without cause.
However, we have seen that the most basic of physical theory today, the quantum
mechanics, keeps silence about causes of something that happens. How can this be
explained?
Roughly, there are two possible explanations. The first is to keep the causality
principle and to assume that quantum mechanics is incomplete: the causes do exist
but are not captured by quantum mechanics. Indeed, the causality principle cannot
be falsified: if we do not see the cause of something that happens, then we can
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always assume that the cause exists but we do not see it. The second is to accept
that the quantum mechanics is complete and to abandon the causality principle:
the causes do not exist. This is what most physicists but not all underwrite. For
example, Albert Einstein was unable to accept the completeness.
If one accepted the incompleteness then one ought to propose a specific alternative
theory, in which the description of states is quantitatively more detailed than in the
quantum mechanics. In this way, the causes could be described as differences in
the values of some additional parameters, the so-called hidden variables. Such a
theory had to be necessarily more involved than quantum mechanics but it must
simultaneously reproduce all its measurable results. In spite of great effort of many
years, no such theory has been constructed and no empirical support for it has been
found.3 Moreover, it has been shown that the hiden variables had to have very
strange properties (action at a distance etc.).
Hence, accepting the completeness of the quantum mechanics is more plausible.
It does not imply that we have to abandon the causality principle altogether. There
certainly are causes for a vast number of events that happen. Everything we need
is to modify the principle:
Something that happens must happen because of a cause. The rest of
what happens can, however, come into being without a cause so that
there is a free choice between possibilities from a specific list. What has
a cause, what is free and what are the possibilities lists is regulated.
Let us call this Weak Causality Principle. A model of such a regularity is quantum
mechanics. The causes and liberties are strictly regulated so that we always know
what is predictable, what is not and what are then the alternative possibilities. More
everyday model are the rules of chess. There are some rules according to which the
stones must be moved but there is, in every position, more or less freedom in the
choice of the move compatible with these rules.
Can the weak causality be included into a coherent picture of the whole world?
In particular, is it compatible with the rest of physics? We have seen that what
happens within the Newton mechanics satisfies the (strong) causality principle, but
we have also mentioned that the validity of the Newton mechanics is limited and
this removes possible contradictions. Quantum mechanics, of course, is all right.
3There are deterministic models of some restricted kind (non-relativistic) of quantum mechanics
such as the pilot-wave theory. They are, however, not suitable to be extended.
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2.5 A subtle change in the interpretation
of general relativity
However, there is another modern theory called General Relativity, which describes
the world on the large scale. An important theoretical concept of general relativity
is that of space-time. This is a four dimensional space so that there are four indepen-
dent directions at each point, three space-like and one time-like and the space-time
includes all space points at all times. The manifold carries the so-called space-time
geometry that determines distances and time intervals and it also carries matter.
The general structure is similar to that of the Newton theory in that it admits a
number of different space-times (=systems), that there are states filling up certain
state spaces that are different for different space-times and that there is a dynamical
equation.
The global character of general relativity is quite essential if we are to compare it
with Newton or quantum mechanics. There does not seem to be much choice of the
system now especially when the theory describes the whole world for all times. We
can still maintain that the space-rimes represent different models of the universe.
It is, however, difficult to require from physicists to set up an arbitrary state of a
whole world in their laboratory at an arbitrary instant of time.
The character of states is different in general relativity in still another way. They
are associated with spacelike hypersurfaces in the spacetimes. A hypersurface is a
mathematical constructions rather than anything real. A space-time can be repre-
sented by many different trajectories in the space of states corresponding to different
foliations by spacelike hypersurfaces of the space-time.
There is no mark on the space-time that would distinguish the present instant
from all the other ones and there is consequently no difference between the struc-
tures of past and future. The usual interpretation is to say that this difference is
purely subjective and that the present instant can be anywhere depending on where
is the observer, while the space-time is considered as an observer-independent de-
scription of the total reality. The reality is thus fixed for all times. This deterministic
conception of world is called Block Universe by some philosophers [9].
However, the picture of time that follows from the weak causality is dominated
by an asymmetry between past and future. The future does not yet exist and more
possibilities are still open for it. The past is fixed, in principle, because the choices
are done at the present instant. Such an asymmetry is not new in philosophy.
Our ideas are similar to Popper’s [4]. Thus, the task to make the weak causality
compatible with general relativity requires to solve two problems. First, to see if
the randomness can be included into the dynamical equation and second, to specify,
where do the choices take place.
To prepare the inclusion of the randomness, some words must be said about the
10
nature of the dynamical equation. Each space-time has two aspects: the space-time
geometry and the matter. An essential feature of general relativity is that gravity
and space-time geometry are two aspects of one and the same structure. Then,
because matter creates and influences the gravity, the space-time geometry must
depend on the matter. The equation that couples the matter and the space-time
geometry is called the Einstein equation. If the model contains no matter, then the
Einstein equation can simultaneously serve as the dynamical equation of gravity.
Now, in constructing a universe model, we are free to choose various kinds of
matter and this can also be done in such a way that the evolution of matter depends
on some random variables taking values from a set of possibilities4. Then, the
corresponding dynamical equation will not be deterministic. A state of the universe
at one instant of time together with its dynamical equation do not determine its state
at the next one unless the next values of the random parameters are chosen. Such
a simplified model shows that randomness can in principle be included in general
relativity.5
However, an instant of time is a space-like hypersurface that can be chosen arbi-
trarily in the spacetime. If a relativist calculates an evolution, he first chooses an
initial hypersurface and, second, he specifies some rule, called gauge choice, of how
time is then to proceed along with the evolution of geometry and matter governed
by the dynamical equations. It can be proved that the result is independent of the
gauge choice. We shall try to require a similar independence in the evolution con-
taining random elements. For that, of course, would be necessary that the choices
are the same even if they are done along different spacelike hypersurfaces.
One obvious way to do that is to assume that the choices are made locally. Then,
if two hypersurfaces intersect at a point, one can recognize if the choices done along
one of them at the point coincide with that done along the other at the same point.
Let us call these points, or some smeared version of it, Local Presences. We assume
that local presences have an objective, that is observer independent, real existence,
that is, things really happen at their time and places. The local presences they are
the only source of our evidence about reality.
Some readers could ask, if we are to worry about realism. Is it not already
4More precisely, the state equation of the matter contains some parameters such that any
time dependence of the parameters is compatible with the Einstein equation, (satisfying certain
conservation laws) and can be considered as a part of the evolution. Such a construction can easily
be performed for homogeneous and isotropic cosmological models.
5It should be mentioned that some models containing classical gravity and quantum matter
have been studied thoroughly [10] but then the gravity source has been assumed to be the average
value of its quantum behaviour. This is of course only an approximation valid in the cases when
the average value describes all quantum possibilities in a sufficiently precise way. (Technically, this
means that the mean quadratic deviation is negligible.)
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generally accepted that quantum mechanical evidence, especially after Aspect ex-
periments, definitely disproved realism (we use the notion of realism as explained,
e.g., by [13])? The answer is that it is not generally accepted and that a lot of
research on this problem is being done. We shall try to keep to the old-fashioned
realism as long as it will be possible.
From inside our local presence, we can observe what is just happening further
away, for example at the Andromeda nebula. What we can see is going on within
some local presences there, which have to be arranged along our past light cone and
are shifted by some millions of years from our local presence because of the distance
and the velocity of light. We still assume that what we observe there are some
aspects of an observer independent reality as it was in its time there.
However, what is the past? Clearly, the past exists only as a memory (i.e., a
specific arrangement of synaptic strengths in some brain) or other kind of record
that an observer, or a family of observers, can make about the observations done
within each of their progressing extended presences. Only in this indirect way does
the past have to do with reality. (Childhood memories are subjective, the child itself
in its time was real.)
The records are analyzed, compared and ordered: processed. This is an important
part of the game. Certain entities can be found that seem to be always there (such
as space-time events, specific classes of objects and fields). For certain aspects
of the entities, temporal and spatial relations seem to be valid, for instance, the
arrangement of space-time events into a smooth manifold with some geometry. Some
causal relations can be summarized and generalized in the form of evolution laws.
Other aspects of the entities can exhibit a kind of liberty. In this way, a picture of
some broader space-time structure emerges so that the pasts of different observers
can be included into a unique one. The aim is to construct a logically coherent
set of explaining and ordering hypotheses from which all evidence can be logically
deduced.
The past as a (processed) record seems to be fixed in all aspects and details.
There are two very different reasons for that. First, the choice from the alternatives
of all liberties has been done and no change is any more possible. Second, we
usually suppose that different observations or observations of different observers
concerning these already done choices can finally be put into agreement, or that their
contradictions can be satisfactorily explained. In particular, any small neighborhood
inside of a past describes what happened when it was a presence and it can be
considered as a local presence of any observer being then in it, and the assumption
is that his observations within this local presence will not in principle contradict
ours. This is a rather non trivial hypothesis on which, in fact, all of the science
is based; it has a natural explanation in the philosophical realism. We call this
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hypothesis The Uniqueness of History.
Finally, what is the future? The very existence of future is a hypothesis based
on the analysis of the records which confirm that, as yet, the presences have always
progressed. Similarly, we can extrapolate the existence of the entities and the validity
of the laws to where we cannot make direct observations, in particular into the future
of each respective cone. Only in this way, we can make predictions. On the other
hand, the predictions can concern always only a part of the future. As we have seen,
there are also unpredictable aspects. Thus, some part of the world is newly created
(”chosen by Nature” under more possibilities, cf. [4]) at the presences, another part
is determined by the past.
The ideas described up to now are also supported by the contemporary knowledge
of how brain neocortex works, even in mice. It constructs a structured, i.e., already
processed, memory record of all experienced (interesting aspects of) presences and
uses this material to create expectations (cf. [14]). Similarly, the human science is
being made, at least in principle and in rough features, analogously, leading from
records to predictions, too. The nature of scientific reasoning is described in [11].
We can say pointedly: What really exists are only the local presences. The past as
well as the future are nothing but products of neocortex.
Now, we can answer the question of how the space-times of general relativity
are to be interpreted: The space-time must be just a hypothetical past, that is, the
unique history of an evolution assumed to be completed (cf. [12]). With other words,
a spacetime can be viewed as one possibility of the Liberty of Universe, which is the
union of all liberties. The problem of asymmetry between future and past does not
even arise because we are considering only the pasts.
The above is only a subtle reinterpretation of general relativity because it does not
seem to lead to changes in any calculation and any discussion concerning measurable
properties within general relativity and with the Einstein equation done as yet. The
reason is, that such calculations and discussions can primarily apply only to past
evidence and hypotheses formed primarily about the past, as it has been explained
above. If we accept this change in interpretation of general relativity, then the weak
causality principle becomes compatible with the whole of the contemporary physics.
3 How liberty can be defined
The discussion of the foregoing section has already suggested the conception of
liberty as a choice among different possibilities that is compatible with the laws
of physics. To see the existence of such a liberty is still not easy because of what
we have called the uniqueness of history. The records of the past are unique and
hence there does not seem to be any freedom. Even if there is such a freedom, the
13
possibilities have already been chosen and the history cannot be changed. How did
we come to think that there is any freedom?
Recall how the described experiment revealed the liberty in the position of the
photon. The experiment consisted of many runs performed at different times, each
of them giving a different result. The conditions of each run were specified so that
the experimentalist could say: Each run started under the same relevant conditions.
This is the crucial point. Apparently, the time and location of the run does not
belong to the relevant conditions. Then, it becomes meaningful to say that the
same experiment is repeated and that it gives the same or different result as a
previous one. This motivates the following definition:
The liberty of a system is associated with certain reproducible conditions
and it is defined as the list of different possibilities that are open to the
system under the conditions.
The important words ”system”, ”reproducible conditions” and ”possibilities” have
here a more general meaning than in the photon experiment and are explained below.
The two words ”liberty” and ”freedom” will distinguish two different concepts in
what follows. The liberty as defined above is a relatively simple notion that can be
applied even to photons. The freedom will be applicable to living organisms and will
denote the fact that the organisms are equipped with the structures, mechanisms
and methods that enable them to utilize liberties 6.
The term ”system” need not be a simple physical system such as a photon or a
bullet, but can denote more complex objects such as living organisms. The speci-
fication of the object that appears as the system in the definition can be a part of
the relevant conditions. This has been the case in the photon experiment, where the
nature of the source has constituted a part of the conditions and guaranteed also
that what has been sent out was a photon.
The term ”reproducible conditions” expresses the main idea of our definition.
A liberty is always understood in connection to certain conditions. In principle,
broader or narrower conditions allow more or less liberty. However, the choice of
conditions is not arbitrary. We assume that the same set of conditions is often
fulfilled in different cases, may this happen spontaneously in Nature or may it be
sufficiently easy to be arranged by people. A complete list and a clear description
of the relevant conditions must enable the check whether the same conditions are
satisfied in different cases or not. The reproducibility is the property that makes the
liberties empirically manageable and theoretically derivable, similarly as the laws of
Nature are.
6Thus, the meaning of both words is appreciably extended in comparison with their current
use. I apologize for this violence, but I could not find better words and shall accept any better
proposal.
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The ”possibility” ought to really exist as opposed to a purely thought one, in
the sense that its realization can be observed at least in some cases in which the
conditions are satisfied. It can be an effect of a cause that lies outside the condition
set so that some of the possibilities has its own cause in a given case. It can as well
be that for its particular realization no cause can be found and even need not exist,
such as it has been assumed in quantum mechanics and stated by the weak causality
principle. Or there can be a mixture of chances with causes. Our definition of liberty
is such that it does not include the way in which its possibilities are realized. It may
go in a random way by a chance or in a deterministic way by a cause. The same
possibility of a given liberty can be realized in different ways in different cases. We
shall see complex examples with a lot of interesting structure later.
The number or some other measure of the amount of all possibilities can even serve
as a numerical value of liberty. For example, if there are N different possibilities,
we can define lnN to be the value of the liberty.7
Let us recall some examples from the physics section. The conditions of the
liberty observed in the photon experiment are that the nature of the source is to
sends out photons in the state of sharp momentum, second, that the measurement
apparatus is a photographic plate of certain kind and third, that the devices are
arranged in a fixed way. All conditions concern only macroscopic properties of the
devices, but the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics considers them as
maximally narrow: no further conditions exist that would be relevant. That is;
other possible accompanying circumstances such as e.g., the time and location of
the measurement, the conjunction of planets and stars, the mood of the boss, the
state of the stock exchange, etc. can indeed be shown to have no observable influence
on the course and results of the experiment. The possibilities are the points at the
plate that can become black. These are all pooints of the plate, forming in this
way a well defined list of possibilities. The liberty could be measured, e.g., by the
logarithm of the area of the plate.
Some liberties are important and useful even if their conditions do not form a
maximally narrow sets. That is, further conditions could be added, at least in
principle, so that the number of possibilities will decrease. Such liberties do not
logically contradict the (strong) principle of causality or the determinism. The
statistical physics of thin gases in equilibrium yields an example. The conditions
are that the total energy, the total volume and the total number of molecules in
the vessel have certain values at certain time t. Such conditions are compatible
with a huge number of mechanical states of the gas molecules at t. The number
of possibilities equals the number of possible states. If any such state really occur
at t then there can be a cause of it in the past to t that has nothing to do with
7If each possibility has its own probability, then the Shanon formula for entropy could be used.
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the conditions. These conditions could in principle be narrowed so that just one
arbitrary fixed mechanical state would be allowed at the time t. Then, there would
be only one possibility.
Another liberty of such a kind is connected with the so-called emergent phenom-
ena. These are properties of complex systems that cannot be derived exclusively
from the properties of its individual constituents. One can also say that the whole
is greater than the sum of its parts. The simplest example are two electrons, two
protons and two neutrons. They can form either an atom of helium or two deuterons
so that we cannot say what are the properties of the composition if no additional
information about the structure is available. The reason is that there are two possi-
bilities of how the constituents may combine. The possibilities constitute a liberty
that we can call liberty of combination. We can generalize it by counting also the
numbers to the possibilities. Then, the three kinds of constituent above can combine
into about one hundred stable atoms and these atoms can combine into zillions of
stable molecules, crystals and mixtures. This is a huge liberty, which underlies the
surprising wealth of structures in Nature.
4 How living organisms
take advantage of liberties
The limited knowledge of the author in the fields of biology, ethology and brain
research may make the following deliberations somewhat uncertain. He apologizes
for irritating inaccuracies that a specialist surely would find if any happened to read
this section. Still, it seems that the main idea ought not to be completely wrong in
particular also because it is little more than a reformulation of Darwinism built on
the notion of liberty. We shall see how this notion can throw some fresh light on a
number of facts of life.
4.1 Liberty of mutation
Let us start by a short story about how a species of bacteria called staphylocco-
cus aureus develops a resistance to a new antibiotic. The antibiotic reacts with a
molecule of the bacterium cell in such a way that some life process is disturbed.
Thus, this molecule ought to be changed so that it does not react lethally with
the antibiotic any more. Of course, the structure of the cell must be sufficiently
flexible so that all life processes can also run with the new molecule. Let us call
mutations all changes that satisfy the second condition. The allowed mutations can
be considered as the possibilities of a liberty. We call it the liberty of mutation. All
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conditions of this liberty is just the ability to live of the mutated staphiloccocus cell.
The resistance can develop only if the liberty of mutation is sufficiently large.
How do mutations come about in the first place? It seems that this is more or less
random process that works all time and that has no plan or aim. Bombardment by
some radiation such as cosmic rays, disturbance by some contingent chemistry and
physics, or even some contact with other bacteria and viruses can be effective. Muta-
tions occur with single molecules and it seems that quantum mechanics is important
for them. In any case, there is enough space for randomness. It is true that the
occurence of the mutation protecting the bacterium from the antibiotic has non-zero
but very low probability. However, there is a very large number of staphyloccocus
around. This number multiplies the probability, making the favorable mutation
feasible.
The cell with the mutation must be there before the antibiotic is applied. The
antibiotic then kills all cells except for those that exhibit the advantageous mutation.
We can say that the antibiotic makes a selection, a choice among the possibilities of
the liberty.
Finally, the trick must be remembered in some way so that it can be applied
against each future antibiotic attack. The mechanism working in bacteria is the
following. Every cell has a genetic blueprint, written down in a particular molecule
of deoxyribonucleinacid (DNA). The mutation must first appear in the molecule of
DNA of a parent cell, and only then, as the result of the cell division, it is referred to
the molecule that reacts with the antibiotic in a daughter cell. That is because the
new blueprint is used for the construction of new cells in the process of cell division.
Each of them also inherits a copy of the blueprint. In this way, the mutation is
completed, remembered and proliferated.
DNA is a chain of four kinds of building blocks, the nucleotides. The ability of
DNA to carry information is based on the indistinguishability of different nucleotides
of the same kind and so on quantum mechanics. The most important property is
that the sequence of nucleotides can be arbitrary. Each sequence, of any length and
order, can be joint into a stable molecule of DNA. This is a kind of chemical liberty
with the possibilities being the different sequences, and it is restricted only by the
problem of keeping very long chains undisturbed and accessible.
We can identify three essential processes in how living organisms utilize liberties.
First, there must be a real liberty in our sense, that is, its conditions are fulfilled
sufficiently often and all its possibilities can really occur or, they can be realized; we
call this process realization. The possibilities are realized in processes including pure
chance, contingency as well as causal laws. The liberty must be sufficiently large to
contain some advantageous possibilities. Second, the choice between the possibilities
must be done so that the advantageous one prevails; we call this process selection.
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Third, the advantageous possibility must be remembered for future use; we call this
process memory. Realization, selection and memory are very general processes that
always constitute the strategy of living organisms with respect to liberties. More
exactly:
A Freedom is the ability of living organisms to carry out the processes
of realization, selection and use of memory with respect to a liberty.
An example of how the realizability concerning the mutation liberty can be im-
proved in complexer organisms than bacteria is the phenomenon of sex. The claim
that sex would enhance human liberty may seem preposterous. However, we have
in mind the liberty of mutation rather than the freedom of will.
Let us give a simplified introduction to sex phenomenon that will be sufficient
for understanding which liberty is improved by sex and how it works. We will draw
upon [15] to a large extent. First, within the whole genetic material of an organism,
its DNA, shorter pieces called genes can be found each of which code for some
property, such as the color of eyes, say. Within all individuals of a fixed species,
more genes with the same function but different results can be found. In this way,
more genes, like the brown eye and the blue eye gene, are rivals for the same slot on
the DNA; such rivals are called alleles. The origin of the alleles lies in a step by step
mutations occurring in different lineages. There is a sense in which the genes of the
population including all alleles resulting in this way can be regarded as a gene pool.
The population is constituted by all contemporary individuals of a species. In this
sense, the pool is a propriety of a species at a given time.
Now, there are many ways in which a possible gene combinations forming a whole
DNA molecule that would encode for a viable individual could in principle be chosen
from the pool. All these combination possibilities form a part of what we have called
the liberty of mutation. But could such combinations come about in a reasonable
time? It turns out that the phenomenon of sex does just that.
Each cells of an individual contains the blueprint for the whole body, not only for
the cell itself. In the species that can reproduce sexually, most cells of an individual
contain exactly two copies of it, one from the father and one from the mother of
the individual. Only the sexual cells of the individual, eggs or sperms, contain just
one copy. During the manufacture of these cells, some bits of each parental DNA
physically detach themselves and change places with exactly corresponding bits of
maternal DNA. The process of swapping bits of DNA is called crossing-over. It
seems that the choice of the points on the DNA where the pieces have their ends is
random. It is, moreover, different in each sexual cell of the same individual. The
density of the points at which the DNA is broken by crossing-over is sufficiently
large for something to happen at all and sufficiently small so that there is a large
probability for clusters of several genes to stay together and to be copied truly.
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Because of sex and crossing-over the gene pool is kept well stirred, and the genes
partially shuffled. Thus, the realization of very different possibilities of mutation
liberty is accelerated so that the incidence of bold changes is strongly enhanced. In
the whole process starting from the choice of sexual partner through the crossing-
over in each sexual cell to the combination of a sperm with an egg, something is
subject to causal laws but a lot is purely accidental. This is often so with the
realizability.
The selection mechanism works only on the level of individuals because it is driven
by the success or failure of whole individuals. This means that the selection does
not act on the genes directly. As far as a gene is concerned, its alleles are its deadly
rivals, but other genes are just a part of its environment. The effect of the gene
depends on its environment. Sometimes a gene has one effect in the presence of a
particular other gene, and a completely different effect in the presence of another
set of companion genes.
The memory that would be necessary to remember the best combinations of alleles
is worsened by the sex. The necessary random break up of the whole combination
comes about independently of how advantageous the DNA of the mother or of the
father has been. Only those pieces of DNA can be copied truly that are short enough
so that their break up during crossing-overs has a very low probability. These can
be clusters of just a relatively small number of genes. That is why single genes or
relatively small clusters of genes are units of heredity in the sexually reproducing
organisms rather than the whole DNA as in bacteria.
Hence, the long-term consequence of non-random individual death and reproduc-
tive success are manifested in the form of changing gene frequencies in the gene
pool. Evolution is the process by which some genes become more numerous and the
others less numerous. On one hand, sex greatly improves the realizations, on the
other, it subtly impairs the memory. Sex is a delicate phenomenon.
4.2 The liberty of motion
Some multicellular organisms such as animals possess an additional liberty that we
shall call liberty of motion. This means that parts of animal body, e.g., trunks, legs
or wings, can take different relative positions to each other without inhibiting other
functions of the body. The change of this relative position, if there are no external
hindrances, can be carried out with various velocities and external bodies can be
shifted thereby with various forces. This defines a list of possibilities—the liberty—
that can in principle be realized by each individual body. Plants can also perform
limited motions and have some choice, for instance between different possibilities of
growing, but these are not included in our definition.
It seems that animal motions are always organized with the help of some nervous
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system. Experiments show that certain nerve signals trigger certain motions. ”Use-
ful” sequences of motions such as running or flying are carried out by specialized
sets of nerves connected in a particular way. Moreover, some influence of sense data
on motions are made possible by other connections of nerves. The influence can
be direct so that some stimulus elicites some motion, or modulary so that some
stimulus modulates the strength of some direct connection.
The wiring of the nervous system—which neuron is connected to which—is in-
herited and fixed. However, the strength of some part of the connections is variable.
There is a liberty called synaptic plasticity [16]. Its possibilities are different strength
of the connections. There is a certain threshold so that the connection is broken, if
the strength falls under it etc. The animal can start with arbitrary strengths; the
starting strengths contain an some space for randomness. The choice from the list of
possibilities is causal, certain choices following certain stimuli or (time-ordered) sets
of stimuli. Such changes in the synaptic strengths can last several minutes, which
constitutes a short-term memory, or for weeks or years, the long-term memory. The
process is called learning. Many examples of learning starting with invertebrates
are can be found in [16].
The learning has some limitations, because many connections are fixed. An ex-
ample thereof is the experiment with the insect species sphex ichneumoneus as
described by Dennett [3], P. 82:
When the time comes for egg laying, the wasp Sphex builds a burrow
for the purpose and seeks out a cricket which she stings in such a way
as to paralyze but not kill it. She drags the cricket into the burrow, lays
her eggs alongside, closes the burrow, then flies away, never to return.
In due course, the eggs hatch and the wasp grubs feed of the paralyzed
cricket, which has not decayed, having been kept in the wasp equiva-
lent of deep freeze. To the human mind, such an elaborately organized
and seemingly purposeful routine conways a convincing flavor of logic
and thoughtfulness—until more details are examined. For example, the
wasp’s routine is to bring the paralyzed cricket to the burrow, leave it
on the threshold, go inside to see that all is well, emerge, and then drag
the cricket in. If the cricket is moved a few inches away while the wasp
is inside making her preliminary inspection, the wasp, on emerging from
the burrow, will bring the cricket back to the threshold, but not inside,
and will then repeat the preparatory procedure of entering the burrow
to see that everything is all right. If again the cricket is removed a few
inches while the wasp is inside, once again she will move the cricket up to
the threshold and re-enter the burrow for a final check. The wasp never
thinks of pulling the cricket straight in. On one occasion this procedure
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was repeated forty times, always with the same result.
What appears here as a lack of freedom is in fact a lack of the freedom precisely in
our sense: some connections cannot be changed.
4.3 Liberty of portable neural representatives
There are processes in nervous systems that are based on learning but are more com-
plicated than it. The existence of such processes in nervous system of invertebrates
are suggested e.g. by experiments by Jim Gould with honeybees. The following
description is borrowed from [17].
The bees seem to remember some aspects of the environment of their hive and
are also able to describe routes within this environment to each other by a kind of
body language, the so-called dance.
...finding food depends less on luck and more on sampling from rela-
tively well known foraging sites, areas where food availability depends
on seasonal variation in polen. When a honeybee forager returns and
dances, other hive mates pay attention. Depending on information in
the dance and the current needs of the hive with respect to finding food
as opposed to storing it, the observers will either stay put or go out on
their own foraging expedition. The observer must therefore process the
information in the dance and then place it within a system of spatial
representation...
...Gould observed a hive that has been maintained near a lake for a long
period of time. This provided some insurance that the honeybees were
familiar with the local environment. Each day, one group of foragers
was trained to move from a release spot away from the hive to a boat
on land, stashed with nectar; once they loaded up on a meal, they were
captured and prevented from returning to the hive. Over the course of
several days, the boat was displaced further and further from the release
site until one day it was square in the middle of the lake. At this point,
the foragers were allowed to collect nectar from the boat and then return
home. When the foragers arrived at the hive, they danced, indicating the
location of the nectar-ladden boat. Although the hive paid attention to
the dance, virtually no one flew out of the hive. Gould suggests that the
honeybees responded to the forager’s dance by referencing their cognitive
map. As for this colony, the map fails to reveal a ”Food Here” sign in
the middle of the lake. Sceptical of the dancer’s message, hive members
wait for a more reliable dancer. (PP. 77-78.)
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The information about the environment is represented and stored in the honeybee
nervous system forming thus a real entity different from the environment itself. It
has to be created during the life of individual honeybees rather than built in from
the inherited DNA (to build it into the DNA would require thousands of years): it
has been learned. In Gould’s experiment, some neural representative of the position
of, or the way to, the food source forms in the forager honeybee nervous system from
the sensory data and its own motions during the flight; it is also learned. The dance
reexpresses it as a sequence of motions that can be ”understood” by the hive mates.
That is, observing the dance they can build, learned in this way, a representative of
the food way in their nervous systems.
The representatives of sensory data, of motion sequences and of environments
concerning Gould’s honeybees are examples of what we shall call portable neural
representative, (PNR). It is a neural representative formed during the life of an
individual and the nervous system is able to work directly with these representatives;
the word ”portable” is to distinguish it from the fixed neural representatives of, say,
sequences of motions that have been inherited. Any PNR must clearly be based
on some arrangement of synaptic strengths in a specific set of neurons, which are
not known in detail. The existence of such a representative is just inferred from
behaviour. The name ”portable neural representative” reminds of what is really
known now. It is, however, sufficiently general, it leaves many details open, and is
thus suitable for our purposes.
The bee nervous system is then apparently able to compare the message PNR
with the PNR of the environment in order to see whether one is to stay put or
to fly out. These and other PNR (such as concerning some work in the hive) are
apparently used in the process of selecting the motion sequences before any actual
motions are done. The chosen motion is not just a learned specific response to a
specific cue. There never has been such a dance before!
Important observable data in this experiment are the numbers of bees that fly
out and that do other motions. The relative numbers differ from case to case. The
bees themselves are identical clones from the point of view of heredity. This suggests
that the different decissions must be due to different PNR to start with. If so, there
may also be some random factor.
More numerous and more convincing are experiments with mammals showing
similar or more flexible use of memory for choices of motion [16]. The honeybees
are much more primitive, in particular they do not posses any hypocampus. There
is some discussion about interpretation of Gould’s experiments [17]. However, for
the thesis of the present subsection, Gould’s experiments are not vital.
What is the relevant liberty? The ability of nervous systems to form in principle
more or less arbitrary PNR without disturbing the function of the system is similar
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to the liberties of mutation or motion and we call it liberty of portable neural
representative. It is apparently based on the synaptic plasticity However, some more
specific account of this liberty similar to the previous two is difficult because little
is known about the actual structure of PNR in nervous systems. Neural network
models of nervous systems might probably be used to get some insight. In any case,
this part of Sec. 4 is more hypothetical than the previous one.
This experiment shows how the memory enters the process at many points, we
can also find a well-defined selection, but we have only a nebulous idea of how the
realization of the possibilities and how the selection proceed within the individual
nervous system.
After the choice of a PNR for going out or staying put, the nervous system brings
about an actual sequence of motions compatible with it. Thus, the liberty of PNR is
associated with the liberty of motion in a similar way as the liberty of mutation is,
but it constitutes a distinctly different kind of liberty. By it, the choice procedure
is shortened from the time interval covering many generations to a time interval
shorter than one individual life. In such a way, the nervous system that might
originally just serve to organize motions into suitable sequences becomes the most
powerful instrument for utilizing liberties by living organisms.
4.4 The freedom of will
The freedom of will is usually understood as the freedom to select in mind consciously
an idea of an action and then to carry out the action. The action can be a sequence
of motions, but it also can be another conscious mental action. The consciousness
component distinguishes this freedom from the others. We assume that every idea
has a portable neural representative and that it is conscious. Then we can effectively
restrict ourselves to PNR and the liberty underlying the freedom of will is again the
liberty of PNR .
What is exactly the consciousness, in particular, how it is represented by any
nervous processes in the brain, seem to be not known. However, some phenomeno-
logical understanding is possible and it will be sufficient for our purposes. This
means that whether or not anything is conscious for a person must be decided or
reported by the person [18]. Of course, recent findings support strongly the idea that
unconscious processes are very important and ubiquitous in all cerebral activities.
Accordingly, the role of the freedom of will must be smaller that some people would
like to think. But we are going to argue that the existence of a kind of this freedom
can be assumed without problems.
To begin with, it may be interesting to observe that consciousness has a strong
memory component. Not only is one aware of something (that is, conscious of it),
but one must also be aware of what one was aware of in the past, so that the well
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known roughly continuous, time ordered, stream of consciousness results. This so
called declarative memory is heavily used by consciousness all the time.8
The crucial hypothesis of this subsection says that the consciousness is a tool
that enables one to better use one’s liberty of PNR because it is essentially an
instrument for complicated symbol manipulations or scenario runnings as well as for
the utilization of such calculation results for the choice of actions. The unconscious
brain is usually not able to do such calculations alone because it has originally had a
different purpose and this may partially explain that all conscious thinking is rather
awkward, energetically expensive and relatively slow.9
It is interesting that digital computers are also tools to make complicated calcu-
lations. Thus, the consciousness can be understood as a method by which we make
our brain emulate a digital computer. This aspect of consciousness is well-known
and a relatively simple one. It is central for the understanding of the freedom of will
that will be put forward in this paper. We can leave the question open, whether or
not the consciousness is, at least in main features, reducible to this aspect.
This is not to say that brain solves complicated mathematical problems in the
same way as a computer would do. Actually, we do not maintain that unconscious
processes are excluded from the whole solution process. Just the opposite is well
known to be true. However, conscious processes are necessary at some stages simi-
larly as computers are needed at some stages of modern research projects.
4.4.1 The experiments by Libet
Our hypothesis has several agreeable properties. One of them is that it gives a nice
and unexpected interpretation to the celebrated experiments by Benjamin Libet
[18]. Libet’s experiments are ingenious and very enlightening for everybody studying
consciousness, but we shall not accept all Libet’s interpretations. A short account
of relevant material that will be sufficient for our purposes can be found in the
Foreword to [18]:
Libet’s work has focused on temporal relations between neural events
and experience. He is famous in part for discovering that we uncon-
sciously decide to act well before we thing we’ve made the decision to
act. ... Libet asked people to move their wrist at a time of their choos-
ing. The participants were asked to look at moving dot that indicated
the time, and note the precise time when they decided to flex their wrist.
The participants reported having the intention about 200 milliseconds
8However, the process of getting directly aware of something is known to be independent from
the process of storing it in the memory.
9The consciousness may be slow for other reasons, too [18].
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before they actually began to move. Libet also measured the ”readiness
potential” in the brain, which is revealed by activity recorded from the
supplementary motor area of the brain (which is involved in controlling
movements). This readiness potential occurred some 550 milliseconds
before the action began. The brain events that produced the movement
thus occurred about 350 milliseconds before the participant was aware of
having made the decision. Libet shows that this disparity is not simply
due to extra time required to note and report the time.
Let us compare the experiment by Gould with that by Libet. In both cases, it
is the nervous system that selects some PNR and starts the action. In both, the
liberty of PNR and of motion is utilized. The two freedoms seem to be of the same.
From the evolutionary (that is, natural selection) point of view, the conscious
component in selecting PNR carries with it both advantages and disadvantages. On
one hand, it enables complicated deliberations and calculations, on the other, it
consumes a lot of energy and time. Now, if we look at the action asked for in Libet’s
experiment, it itself does not require any calculations, it is a simple choice of time
instant. Still, consciousness has been used by the participants before the experiment
in order to understand the task, to reduce it to the simple choice of time instant
and to prepare it thus for the performance. Then, when the experiment is running,
it seems natural that the unconscious brain does not switch in the consciousness
because no complicated scenarios are to be elaborated. It is satisfied, after it has
done the work itself, with merely dropping a notice to the consciousness to enable
a possible veto, and to the consciousness journal (declarative memory) to save this
information for possible later use. It seems that the consciousness is not the master
but a servant.
Our conclusion from Libet’s experiments is therefore different from that of rel-
atively many philosophers or natural scientist. They seem to find there a strong
suggestion, or even a proof, that there is no freedom whatsoever and that one’s
impression of having some is just an illusion. We want to maintain that there is a
lot of freedom, even, say, for the honeybees and that human freedom is even larger
because people can find more possibilities for PNR with the help of conscious calcu-
lations. In our language, the realizability is enhanced. In effect, we do assume that
freedom is not an illusion, but we give the consciousness a smaller role in it.
4.4.2 An example: playing chess
Playing chess is an activity that clearly shows the value of conscious calculations.
There is a well defined liberty: all moves that are allowed by the rules of the game
in a given position. Moves are understood as ideas, not as actual motions of the
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stones (a move is a whole class of such motions), and we again assume that each
move is some conscious PNR.
As a beginner, one is happy to do the first move which pops into one’s conscious-
ness in each position and looks promising, but that leads mostly to a disaster. What
is to do is to consciously calculate developments to which such an idea would lead
without carrying out the moves on the chessboard; a number of such developments
quickly grows if the analysis is extended to the depth of three or more moves and the
situation becomes rather messy. Thus, it is no miracle that many digital computers
play chess better that most people.
The selection between possible moves is done according to the purpose that one
is following. Even if one just wants to win, one’s choices might be different in
the same positions because of changing skills or because one adapts the choice to
one’s knowledge of one’s opponent. It is also conceivable that one does not need
to win. For example, one would like to teach one’s child to play the game, etc. In
any case, there is a reason for one’s choice and we can say that each move that
is actually performed by a given player has a cause within the player, at least in
regular circumstances.
This idea is rather similar to the philosophy of compatibilism, which attempted
to make freedom of will compatible with determinism (see, e.g., [3]). Although we
have rejected determinism, this particular idea of compatibilism is fully taken over
here. Hence, the essence of our freedom is not in the randomness of our moves. Of
course, we can decide to make our moves with the help of dices, but this possibility
does not exhaust the concept of our freedom. We agree with the compatibilists that
the player is the cause of the player’s moves but we do not follow them further in
excluding that the corresponding causal chain has started within the player.
It is only when we are getting at a sufficiently large pool of trial moves from
which the actual move is to be selected where the randomness often plays a role.
The problem is that the computer of our consciousness is not able to do a systematic
analysis even in chess. (Today’s digital computer cannot calculate the game all the
way to the end, either.) We are therefore looking for some move that is motivated by
some properties of the position over which we are sitting. Different moves occur to us
in a way that is not completely systematic. Trying to calculate possible consequences
of each, we learn more about the position so that after rejecting one idea, we are
likely to get another, etc.; it is the method of trial and error (cf. [5]). work need not
obey any overall algorithm. Algorithmic calculations of our conscious mind’s are
mixed with some input of the unconscious brain. Even if the unconscious brain does
not calculate, it often provides surprising associations of ideas, which themselves
may but need not have been obtained by calculation. It seems that the way we
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arrive at the trial moves does not form a strictly causal chain10. In spite of the
unconscious component of getting trial ideas, the definitive move selection is, as a
rule, conscious and it is indeed the cause of the move that is actually carried out.
The final point is that after calculating through the scenarios and choosing among
them consciously, the act of actually moving the stone may contain unconscious
elements. The choice exactly when, how rapidly and along which trajectory the
move is to be done can be, and mostly is, done without any consciousness. However,
this is another liberty. The liberty of the choice between possible chess moves is used
with the help of the conscious calculator. The choice between possible stone moves
compatible with a given chess move is a different one, which is not relevant to our
problem. The question if the conscious mind directly moves the body hand seems to
be less important than whether the body hand moves in accordance with the mind
plan or not.
The game of chess is, of course, a strongly simplified model of life. It provides,
however, all the relevant features of conscious decisions and gives thus an example
that fits the above definition of the free will.
To summarize, the notion of freedom that is defined here is not an illusion. Still,
it is a more complicated phenomenon than is usually assumed. The whole concept of
freedom of living organisms must be separated into several different notions. First,
a kind of relevant liberty must be identified, e.g. the liberty of motion. This is
a relatively simple concept that can be described in precise terms and that can be
studied experimentally. Second, there are ways and methods of how organisms make
use of the liberty. For this an involved, many levels (DNA, nervous and locomotive
systems) structure evolved which supports both random (in realizations) and causal
processes (in selections) and includes a relatively large memory. The way it works
is again accessible by experimental study.
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